By Zach Kauraisa
In 2025, Namibia earned N$120 billion from exports. The mining sector accounted for 53% of total export value; manufacturing accounted for 29%; and agriculture, electricity, fishing and services collectively accounted for 11% of total export value.
Within the mineral export basket, uranium, gold, and diamonds accounted for 93% of total mineral export value. Everything else, from zinc and tin to copper, lead, marble, salt, and semi-precious stones, collectively accounted for 6.6% of the mineral basket – down from 8.9% in 2021.
Beyond the headlines that Namibia’s N$62.5 billion mineral export basket has grown at a +20% compounded growth rate lies an export basket that is becoming more concentrated, more fragile, and more exposed to commodity price shocks.
From 2021 to 2025 uranium expanded its share of total mineral exports from 38% to 45%; diamonds experienced a decline from 30% to 16%; and gold rose from 24% to 32% mainly due to extraordinary price increases.
This mineral export basket has evolved from a three-commodity structure, each with uncorrelated demand drivers, to a single-pillar structure dominated by uranium, with gold as a volatile support and diamonds in a persistent decline.
This article argues that growing non-core mineral exports from 6.6% to at least 15% is a macroeconomic necessity, not an industrial policy aspiration.
The Illusion of Growth
Gold export value grew +40% (N$5.8 billion) in 2025, which is entirely attributable to gold price appreciation. Gold production has been flat at 11 tonnes per annum for the last 3 years, while the gold price has grown 130%.
Flat production means Namibia’s gold revenue moves 1:1 with the gold price. At an all-time high of US$4,300 per ounce, gold is priced on the assumption that geopolitical tension persists and that central banks keep buying as monetary policy eases. Even a moderate 15% to 20% retracement to mid-2024 levels would reduce gold export revenue by N$3 to 4 billion.
Diamonds are already in structural decline. Export value has fallen 42% from its 2023 peak. The Chamber of Mines (CoM) attributes this to laboratory-grown diamond substitution and weakening consumer demand.
The Ministry of Finance projects diamond corporate income tax to fall 69% this year. A continued decline of 10 to 15% over the next two to three years is the base case. The impact of the diamond sector decline on the sovereign is multiplied by a reduction in dividends from the state’s 50% ownership in NAMDEB. The sovereign has no comparable equity position in gold or uranium.
The 2025 National Accounts note that mining real value added contracted 9.4% in 2025, even as nominal mineral exports grew approximately 18%. “Real value added” is measured at constant 2015 base-year prices, which strips out price and exchange rate effects. Only uranium delivered meaningful production expansion, with real value added growing 27%.
The above concentration is compounded by the fact that +95% of gold production comes from B2Gold and QKR, +95% of diamond production comes from Namdeb Holdings, and +83% of uranium production comes from Swakop Uranium and Rössing; which concentrates production in a handful of mines and the operational risks they face.
Under moderate, high-probability assumptions that combine a 15% gold price retracement, continued diamond decline, and some uranium price normalisation partially offset by volume growth, total mineral export revenue would fall by N$5 to 8 billion, an 8% to 13% reduction in mineral export revenue. That is sufficient to reverse several years of apparent growth, reduce mining corporate income tax receipts materially, and, if sustained, place pressure on the external balance.
The Investment Case for Non-Core Minerals
The standard response to concentration risk is diversification, but the more precise question is whether it is achievable, at what cost, and over what time horizon.
Moving non-core mineral exports from 6.6% to 15% of the basket requires approximately N$10 billion in annual non-core mineral exports at current levels. At prevailing commodity prices, this implies a step-change in production volumes across multiple commodities, supported by greenfield mine development, processing infrastructure, and, in some cases, downstream beneficiation. The capital requirement is in the range of N$30 to 40 billion over a 10 to 15 year horizon.
The investment candidates exist. In 2025, Namibia’s most meaningful non-core exports were zinc (N$978m), marble (N$910m), salt (N$853m) and tin (N$537m), with lead, manganese and copper ore exports generating below N$100m each. Lithium, niobium, tantalum, iron, and rare earth deposits are documented. The geological basis for a diversified mineral export base is present. What is absent is the capital to grow production.
The EU pledged EUR 1.3 billion under the Global Gateway initiative to support Namibia’s clean energy plans and the local processing of critical materials. This is a significant opportunity, but it puts processing capital ahead of the mines that would feed it.
Namibia does not produce critical minerals in quantities that justify large scale processing infrastructure development. Without investment into the de-risking and development of mines, this EU mineral processing capital will likely be trapped due to a lack of local feedstock or will be diverted toward clean energy projects.
Each project still has to stand or fall on its own returns, but collective underinvestment in non-core mineral value chains carries a macroeconomic cost that no single project’s returns capture.
Each additional dollar of non-core mineral export revenue reduces Namibia’s exposure to a gold price correction, a diamond demand shock, or a uranium procurement policy change. That resilience benefits the sovereign, not the individual mine operator, and it requires deliberate policy and capital allocation rather than private market forces alone.
What Is Required
First, calibrate fiscal instruments to the economics of base and industrial minerals. In Namibia, zinc, lead, and manganese operate at unit export values of N$2 to N$15 per kilogram, orders of magnitude below uranium (N$2,112/kg) and precious minerals (N$800,000+/kg); which means profit margins vary significantly across mining projects.
This is clear from the fact that the diamond sector has been able to absorb a 55% income tax versus the 37.5% income tax rate applied to other mining companies.
For low priced minerals like iron and manganese, a 5% shift in taxes can move a project from uninvestable to investable, which is the difference between a project being developed and providing tax revenue or a project being abandoned and generating no economic contributions.
The pending Special Economic Zones framework creates an opportunity for nuanced policy that improves the bankability of low-margin, non-core mineral exports.
Second, direct concessional, institutional and commercial capital toward critical mineral value chains at the pre-commercial and early-commercial stages. Blended finance structures, combining DFI concessional capital with commercial co-investment, can absorb the early-stage risk alongside private capital.
The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the US Project Vault create institutional frameworks and funding streams for exactly this type of deployment. South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation’s R1.5b Early-Stage Mining Fund is an example of domestic institutional capital flowing towards de-risking projects and bolstering the project pipeline amidst declining foreign investment.
Third, treat this concentration as more than a risk to be monitored. Every year that non-core minerals remain at 6.6% of the basket is a year in which the economy’s exposure to a gold price correction or a diamond demand shock is unhedged.
There is a need for sovereign and institutional capital to actively plug this risk. Given the 10 to 15 year mine development timeline, by the time an export revenue shock arrives, the investment window will have passed.
*Zach Kauraisa, Investment Professional
