By Stefanie Busch
For over three decades, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1991 has governed Namibia’s upstream petroleum sector.
Under this framework, the Minister of Industries, Mines and Energy holds primary regulatory authority, including directing the issuance of licences, entering into petroleum agreements and making regulations.
The Petroleum Commissioner oversees day-to-day operations, whilst the Minister of Finance plays a role on fiscal matters, with royalty waivers requiring the Finance Minister’s concurrence.
The President’s direct involvement is limited to general executive authority through Cabinet and ministerial appointments. The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Amendment Bill proposes to change this architecture fundamentally.
What is the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Amendment Bill?
The initial framework of the Bill was formally introduced to Parliament by the Minister of Industries, Mines and Energy in November 2025. Subsequently, the Bill was debated by the National Assembly on 4 February 2026. Despite the calls by President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah for urgent passage of the Bill in order to accelerate offshore oil development, the Bill has not been passed to date.
Key Amendments Proposed
- Centralisation of Regulatory Authority
The Bill’s most fundamental reform is the transfer of petroleum administration from the Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy to the Office of the President. The Bill envisages establishing a new Upstream Petroleum Unit (UPU) within the Presidency, headed by a Director-General appointed by the President. The UPU will regulate licensing, monitor compliance, manage petroleum data, promote local content, and conduct inspections. Certain strategic powers – including making regulations, managing royalty remissions and deferrals, providing policy direction, and appointing the Director-General – are reserved to the President personally and are in some instances non-delegable.
In anticipation of the passing of the Bill, the UPU has already been established by the President. However, until such time that the Bill has been passed and come into effect, the provision of the current Act prevail, meaning that all functions relating to the petroleum affairs– by law – still remain with the Ministry.
- Altered Fiscal Oversight Mechanisms
The Bill reduces the Finance Minister’s role on royalty remissions, deferments, or refunds from “concurrence” to mere “consultation.” Under the current Act, such decisions cannot be granted without the Finance Minister’s agreement, providing an independent fiscal check. Under the Bill, the Finance Minister may offer a view but cannot block such a decision.
Assessing the Potential Benefits
The amendments offer potential advantages for the emerging petroleum industry. Centralising regulatory authority may accelerate decision-making by eliminating bureaucratic delays associated with inter-ministerial coordination. For licence holders, this could mean faster approvals for licence extensions, amendments, and work programme variations.
The streamlined structure would also provide a single regulatory counterpart, simplifying engagement with other stakeholders for obtaining required approvals.
When licensing requires coordination across multiple agencies, presidential authority can convene stakeholders and resolve bottlenecks more efficiently than ministerial processes. This could address material bottlenecks already encountered, notably in immigration permitting and the importation of essential equipment.
A dedicated UPU elevated within the Presidency also signals governmental commitment to the sector’s strategic importance, potentially attracting investment by demonstrating that petroleum governance and ease of doing business in that sector commands the highest-level attention of the Government.
Significant Concerns and Risks
- Concentrating power in the Presidency raises concerns regarding the separation of regulatory and policy functions. When the President assumes both roles, there is no independent body to ensure licensing decisions remain insulated from political considerations. The proposed structure may also constrain other Ministries in exercising their sector-specific powers, particularly where such decisions conflict with Presidential priorities. Given that Ministers are appointed by the President, this dynamic may discourage independent decision-making within the executive.
- The accountability architecture is substantially weakened. Under the current framework, the Minister is directly accountable to Parliament; under the proposed framework, this accountability chain is severed. The Director-General, who will make all licensing decisions, is accountable only to the President, not Parliament. The Bill’s sole transparency mechanism, an annual public report, provides information but not accountability, as publishing a document is not equivalent to answering questions before MPs. The Bill does not specify a fixed term for the Director-General, statutory grounds for removal, or provision for regulatory independence. Appointment and removal are at the President’s sole discretion. The Bill also fails to require public asset declarations by the Director-General; any declarations are made only to the President, leaving no mechanism to verify impartiality in licensing decisions.
- The Bill changes the Finance Minister’s role on royalty waivers from ‘concurrence’ to ‘consultation’, meaning the Finance Minister can no longer block such decisions but may only offer a view, removing a key fiscal safeguard. This creates the possibility that royalty remissions could be granted on a discretionary or politically motivated basis, potentially undermining the perceived integrity of the fiscal regime and, as a result, less revenue generated by the State on its petroleum resources.
- The framework creates a ‘key person risk’, whereby regulatory stability depends on individual leadership rather than institutional constraints. The Bill provides no safeguards against a future President who might abuse these powers.
Proposed Amendments to the Bill
Centralising petroleum governance is not inherently problematic – the critical issue is whether sufficient safeguards are embedded. Five amendments would address the most significant concerns:
- Restore the Finance Minister’s concurrence on royalty waivers;
- Establish statutory independence for the Director-General through fixed terms and defined removal grounds;
- Require public disclosure of asset declarations upon appointment and annually;
- Require the Director-General to report directly to Parliament and appear before committees; and
- Include a sunset clause providing that the powers granted to the President, the Director-General and the UPU revert to the Minister responsible for petroleum once the Bill’s stated objective – acceleration of the petroleum industry – has been achieved, such as upon the expiry of a specified number of years following first oil.
Future Implications of the Bill: For better or for worse?
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Amendment Bill represents a fundamental restructuring of Namibia’s petroleum governance at a critical juncture in the sector’s development.
Whilst centralisation may deliver faster decision-making and clearer lines of authority, the Bill as currently drafted contains significant gaps in accountability, transparency, and institutional safeguards – gaps that the five proposed amendments outlined above would significantly address.
The ultimate question is whether Namibia’s petroleum framework will be built on enduring institutional safeguards or on reliance upon the character of whoever holds the Presidency. History counsels caution:
we design institutions on the assumption that future leaders may not share the integrity of present ones. Relying on current good leadership alone is a gamble – it works until it does not, and by then the damage may be irreversible.
* Stefanie Busch, Executive: Projects and Energy, ENS | Namibia
